Abstract: Assignment problems include allocating a set of objects among agents; here, only ordinal preferences are revealed. In this paper, we establish a condition of feasible solutions for deterministic assignments. Related to it, we show then a separation characterisation for probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism, based on sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness and the definition of PS (where 'sd' stands for first-order stochastic dominance). An application to recent result about PS is also described. Models here are suitable for assignment problems in various fields, such as fair sharing of resources in industry. The separation structure proposed here provides a possibility to divide a large-scale problem into several sub-problems.
Introduction
Assignment considered here is an ordinal mechanism. Only ordinal preferences of participants are given, and no cardinal parameters of utility functions are provided.
The probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism is a random assignment suggested in the paper by Bogomolnaian and Moulin (2001) that stimulates many researches in the recent decade.
A prominent attracting property of PS is so-called sd-efficiency or ordinal efficiency. A similar mechanism is also developed when bi-acceptable is conditioned (Bogomolnaian and Moulin, 2002, 2004) . Recently and independently, axiomatic approaches to the PS mechanism are further developed (Hashimoto et al., 2014) . A completely different idea related to PS is also established (Bogomolnaian, 2015) .
On the strict preference domain, the PS mechanism is simple and intuitive. However, when indifferences are allowed, a parametric max-flow network problem has to be established and solved in each step (Katta and Sethuraman, 2006) . Some literatures on random assignment problem focus on simultaneously satisfying various notions of efficiency, fairness, and others. Several impossibility results, usually in cases with no more than six agents, have been established (Sethuraman and Ye, 2015) .
Various extensions have also been developed. The random assignment problem with multiple indivisible goods demands was investigated (Budish et al., 2013; Heo, 2014; Kojima, 2009) . Budish et al. (2013) investigated extensions of the ordinary random assignment problem with additional constraints. Very recently, a totally different approach has been suggested as jointworks of author, where goods are not fixed, they form a family of bases of a matroid , or a family of bases of a polymatroid , and theory of submodular optimization plays a crucial role in the extension (Fujishige, 2005) .
There are also a lot of presentations of related applications. The problem mainly raised in application models (Abdulkadíroğlu and Sönmez, 1998) . Based on the paper by Bogomolnaian and Moulin (2004) , the mechanism to solve two-side preferences provided kidney exchanges between patients and donors, where compatible or incompatible has to been considered (Roth et al., 2005) . A more recent paper by Budish et al. (2013) introduced the problem by several practical assignment examples, and also a separate section to deal with so called pseudo-market mechanism, where agents may have multi-unit demands.
As mentioned in abstract, models in this paper are also suitable for sharing of resources (Katta and Sethuraman, 2006) , especially in emergency situation, where fairness and efficiency are more important.
For more related applications and other details on random assignments, see Section 5 and also recent papers of Hashimoto et al. (2014) and Sethuraman and Ye (2015) .
The motivation of our works is: When the scale of problem becomes large, we need a mechanism to assign objects or jobs in a more efficient and fair manner based on existing results. The separation structure proposed in this paper provides a possibility to divide a large-scale problem into several sub-problems. In practice, assignments do not complete in one procedure, we hope that the mechanism proposed here provides the first step of assignments in transparent and fair manner.
Problem description and definitions
Let N = {1, 2, •••, n} denote a set of individual agents, and A is a set of types of objects, where each type of object a is allowed to accept quata q a ≥ 1 if agent i prefers. Here, we (if a is a set, we means that i prefers each object in a to b). Let R be the set of preferences. For simplicity, we assume that for each agent, the preferences between different types of objects are strict.
A deterministic assignment is a mapping from N to A, where each agent is assigned to exactly one object.
A random or probabilistic assignment is a probability distribution over deterministic assignments.
A random assignment is equivalent to a matrix P = (p ia ) i∈N,a∈A where the element p ia of P represents the probability of assigning agent i to object a.
From the above definition, we have random assignment P = (p ia ) i∈N,a∈A as:
0, for all , .
An assignment is called feasible if it satisfies (1) and (2) given above. 
The random assignment P of above profile may be given by 1 1/ 3 5 / 9 1/ 9 2 1/ 3 5 / 9 1/ 9 3 1/ 3 0 2 / 3 4 0 8/9 1/9
Now, we are ready to define the efficiency and envy-freeness of a random assignment. Given a ∈ A and
be the upper contour set of object a at .
i Let P i be the row of an assignment P, which represents the allocation of objects for agent i in assignment P, and column P a be the allocation of object a to agents. Given two random assignments P and Q, an agent i prefers P to Q, denoted by ,
,
where p ib , q ib are elements of P i , Q i , respectively. One important property of assignment matrices is: P is ordinally efficient or sd-efficient if there is no feasible assignment matrix Q such that for each i ∈ N,
Given a preference file , n ∈ R an assignment P is sd-envy-free (or envy-free for short) if for each i ∈ N we have
PS mechanism
The PS mechanism published in 2001 by Bogomolnaia and Moulin plays a central role for many papers of random assignment in the recent decade. It implements the simultaneous eating algorithm.
The following description of PS is from the paper by Hashimoto et al. (2014) . Given a problem , n ∈ R think of each object a as an infinitely divisible good that agents eat in the time interval [0, 1].
Step 1 Each agent eats away from her favourite object at the same unit speed. Proceed to the next step when an object is completely exhausted.
…
Step s (for s ∈ {2, •••, S}). Each agent eats away her remaining favorite object at the same speed. Proceed to the next step when an object is completely exhausted.
The procedure terminates after S ≤ |N| steps when each agent has eaten exactly 1 total unit of objects (i.e., at time 1). The random allocation of an agent i by PS is given by the amount of each object she has eaten until the algorithm terminates.
The random assignment P of Example 1 is the result of PS. In
Step 1, agents 1-3 eat most favourite object a and agent 4 eats objects b. At time 1/3, object a is exhausted.
In
Step 2, agents 1, 2 and 4 eat the remaining 2 (units) -1/3 of objects b, and agent 4 begins eating object c and so on.
When agents show indifference between several objects (of same type), any preferences between these objects do not affect the problem. In Example 1, suppose (a) all agents prefer b 1 to b 2 or (b) agents 1 and 2 prefer b 2 to b 1 , while agent 4 prefers b 1 to b 2 . Then, we have the column P b of P for (a) and (b) respectively as: 
Therefore, the resulting P is a bistochastic matrix explicitly. The PS mechanism possesses many attractive properties; among these, the one related to the contents of next section is ordinal efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. For more formal axiomatic description, see papers Bogomolnaian and Moulin (2001) and Hashimoto et al. (2014) .
Theorem 1 (Bogomolnaian and Moulin, 2001 ): The random assignment P obtained by PS mechanism satisfies ordinal efficiency and sd-envy-freeness.
A separation structure
In this section, we show our main results on a separation structure related to PS.
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Deterministic assignments
We begin with the following well known result in graph theory (Jungnickel, 2008; Theorem 7.2.5) . Let ( , ) G S T E = ∪ denote a bipartite graph with two disjoint vertex sets S and T, and edge set E between S and T. Obviously, the maximal cardinality of a matching is bounded by min {|S|, |T|}.
Theorem 2 (Hall): Let ( , ) G S T E = ∪ be a bipartite graph, without loss of generality suppose |S| ≥ |T|. For J ⊆ T, let Γ(J) denote the set of all those vertices in S which are adjacent to some vertices in J. Then G admits a full size |T| matching if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
Now, we define a notation that is frequently used in the sequel. Given a ∈ A and an integer k ≤ |N|, let
.
For simplicity of notation, we also suppose that q a = 1 (∀a ∈ A) in the sequel.
Proposition 3: Let k be an integer such that 1 ≤ k < |N|. Suppose for all a ∈ T ⊂ A, |F(k, a)| = m, i.e., constant. Then, we have deterministic assignments such that each a ∈ T is allocated to an agent within her top k preferences.
Proof: Let ( , ) G N T E
∪ be a bipartite graph with nodes sets N and T, edge (i, a) ∈ E is defined as: Object a belongs to the top k preferences of agent i. By the assumption of the proposition, ( , ) G N T E ∪ is regular bipartite graph, i.e., each node in T has degree m, and from the definition, each node in N has degree k. Note that the number of edges of ( , ) G N T E ∪ is m|T| = k|N|, since T ⊆ A and |A| = |N|, we have |T| < |N| and m ≥ k. For any J ⊆ T, let Γ(J) denote the set of all those vertices in N which are adjacent to some vertices in J, we claim |Γ(J)| ≥ |J|. Otherwise, suppose that there is a subset J ⊆ T with |Γ(J)| < |J|, the number of edges from Γ(J) is k|Γ(J)|, less than the number from J, m|J|, a contradiction. Therefore, by Theorem 2, we know that ( , ) G N T E ∪ admits matching of size |T|. Here, the matching is corresponding to deterministic assignment on T. Note that such deterministic assignment (matching) is usually not unique.
From the proof of the above proposition, we see that for all k ≥ 1, we have F(k, A) = N.
Random assignments
Now, we discuss the relation of Proposition 3 with PS. First, we have the following lemma as a special case.
Lemma 4: Let k be an integer such that 1 ≤ k < |N| and T ⊆ A. Suppose F(k, a) = N for all a ∈ T and P is the bistochastic matrix obtained by PS, then we have
Proof: From the assumption of the lemma, for ∀i ∈ N, the first k preferences objects are the set T. By sd-envy-free property of PS described in Theorem 1, we have:
for all , .
ia ja
for all ,
And the sum of |T| columns is equal to that of |N| rows of elements of P corresponding to T. Then, we have (8).
The assumption of the above lemma, i.e., for all a ∈ T, |F(k, a)| = m = |N|, is strong. When m < |N|, the equalities ) for all ,
( 1 2 ) are not guaranteed. Here is such a counter example.
Example 2: Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and T = {a, b, c, d}, the top two preference profile, the first (1st) and second (2nd), and the results of PS are given as follows: 
where the blank in P in the right means zero probability. Although, all elements in T received three first or second choices from agents, their corresponding row sums of allocations by PS are not the same.
If we change some of top two preferences, we obtain a probability allocation by PS that satisfies (12) as follows: In practical allocation, zero probability is a desired property. It shutouts obscurity while keeping, e.x., ordinal efficiency, by PS.
Proposition 5: Assume for some k with 1 ≤ k ≤ |N| and T ⊆ A, |F(k, a)| = m for all a ∈ T, and by PS we have
And the |N| × |T| sub-bistochastic probability matrix is the convex combination of part of permutation matrices corresponding to full size matchings of Proposition 3.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that for some i ∈ N,
It means that at time t there must be an object a ∈ T which is not exhausted. We can increase p ia (i ∈ N) by the definition of PS to get a more sd-efficient matrix, a contradiction. That is, we have
Then, (ii) and (iii) follow from (18). For the latter part of the proposition, by extended classical Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, the |N| × |T| sub-bistochastic matrix is the set of convex combinations of part of permutation matrices, where a full |T| size deterministic assignments exist on T. By property (iii), these are the only assignments that can be extended to permutation matrices to constitute bistochastic matrices on A.
The Proposition 5 can be extended to more than two separate sections.
Let
Proposition 6: The random PS assignment problem can be decomposed into a series of subproblems on partition
where m l is a constant on T l . Here, we assume that r is the largest number that satisfies (20) and (21).
Proof: It follows from Proposition 5 immediately.
Note by definition, we have
An application and discussions
As an application of Proposition 6, recently, Bogomolnaian (2015) characterised PS with a new welfarist interpretation, we introduce and describe it as follows. for all i < j. For each agent i, let t i (k) be the total share of objects from her first k preference objects that i gets, and t i = (t i (1), t i (2), •••, t i (n)).
Theorem 7 (Bogomolnaian, 2015) : For preference profile , n ∈ R PS is exactly the set of feasible assignments which leximin maximise the vector of shares t = (t 1 , t 2 , •••, t n ).
Corollary 8: Suppose the separation structure is as Proposition 6, in each section, leximin maximise property is satisfied.
Proof: By the condition of Proposition 6, each section is independent from other sections. Then the result follows from Theorem 7.
A common mechanism used in practice is the random serial dictatorship (RSD). Agents are randomly (uniformly) ordered and then, in the realised order, agents successively pick their favourite objects from those available.
Example 3 (Bogomolnaian and Moulin, 2001) The RSD and PS assignments are as follows:
In recent years, there are a lot of naturally disasters occurred in Japan. The Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 led to the shortage of electricity power, the damage of supply chain also caused the severe shortage of parts in automobile industry (Ono et al., 2015) . The sharing problem can also be applied to such emergency situations.
Conclusions
In this study, we first showed a separation condition for deterministic assignment. We then extended the condition to random assignment obtained by PS mechanism with efficiency and fairness properties. Although it succeeded with some additional conditions, counter example is founded in general case. An application of the separate structure to a recently result is also offered. The separation structure proposed in this paper provides a possibility to divide a large-scale problem into several sub-problems. In practice, the mechanism obtained here may provide the first step of assignment problems in transparent and fair manner. Finally, possible applications in economics and industries also be described and suggested.
